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Abstract  
We live in an era dominated by global conflict, terrorism and the increasing 
need for defence. It is therefore unsurprising that the global arms trade is thriving. 
However, it is alarming that the arms trade accounts for roughly 40% of all corruption 
in global transactions. It is also troubling that there is little literature regarding the 
extent to which existing anti-corruption regimes can or have combatted arms trade 
corruption. With the aim of contributing to the discourse on arms corruption, this paper 
critically evaluates the scope of the United States (US) Foreign Corruption Practice 
Act (FCPA) in combatting corruption, in particular bribery, within the arms industry. 
Whilst the paper acknowledges the FCPA’s role in helping combat arms corruption, it 
emphasises the FCPA’s limitation and calls for FCPA reform. This paper first 
discusses the FCPA’s origins, functions and extraterritorial jurisdiction to then examine 
corruption within the arms trade industry. It finds that within arms trade, defence offset 
transactions greatly facilitate corruption and the FCPA has failed to effectively regulate 
these transactions. Next, the FCPA’s enforcement power is explored through its fines 
system. Though fear of hefty fines appears to have incentivised FCPA compliance, 
the US government remains silent on how these proceedings are utilised to combat 
corruption. Analysis on the FCPA’s implementation within the US and its global impact 
further reveals the act’s limitations: its non-criminalisation of bribe-recipients, its 
exclusion of grease payments, and most notably its vagueness and poor guidance on 
its terms and regulations. 
Key words: FCPA, Arms Trade, Corruption, Bribery, US, International Business 
Transactions   
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Introduction 
In an era dominated by global conflict, terrorism and the increasing need for 
defence, it is unsurprising that global arms trade is thriving. According to the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, arms trade accounts for roughly 
40% of all corruption in global transactions.1 However, there is little literature regarding 
the extent to which existing anti-corruption regimes can or have combatted arms trade 
corruption. This paper aims to contribute to the discourse on arms trade corruption.  
Though there are various regimes that tackle arms corruption, this paper is 
limited to critically evaluating the scope of the FCPA and whether it is a commendable 
instrument for combatting corruption. More specifically, the discussion centres on 
bribery, as this is the most widespread form of corruption within the arms industry.  
The discussion commences with an introduction of the FCPA, its functions and 
its extraterritorial jurisdiction. This will be followed by an examination of corruption 
within the arms trade industry and the role that defence offset plays in contributing to 
bribery. Attention will be paid to the FCPA’s method (or lack thereof) of tackling 
defence-offset corruption. Subsequently, the paper will draw on the FCPA’s 
enforcement power and its fines system to explore its effectiveness in incentivising 
compliance. This section will also analyse the FCPA’s implementation within the US 
and whether the act has succeeded in its primary aim to safeguard US business 
against corruption, particularly in the arms industry.  
Through a discussion on the FCPA’s vagueness and exclusion of grease 
payments, the final section will critically evaluate the FCPA’s limitations in combatting 
arms bribery and corruption. Whilst the paper acknowledges the FCPA’s role in 
helping combat arms corruption, it emphasises the FCPA’s limitations and calls for 
reform in order to combat arms corruption.  
 
 
 
 
1 Peter Platzgummer, ‘Arms Trade Offsets and Cases of Corruption: The Usage of Anti-Corruption 
Tools in Special Forms of Arms Acquisitions’ (2013) 14(2) International Public Management Review, 
19. 
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Genesis and Function of the FCPA 
Transparency International defines corruption as the ‘abuse of entrusted power 
for private gain.’2 A 1976 investigation by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) exposed rampant corruption within all major US industries, finding 
that more than 400 US companies invested at least $300 million in illegal payments 
and bribery to political parties and foreign governments in order to facilitate trade.3 
American companies were found to have falsified their financial records and used 
‘slush funds’ to facilitate these corrupt payments.4 The US government, which prides 
itself on free trade and business transparency, immediately passed the FCPA in 1977, 
to tighten prohibitions on corruption within American businesses.5  
The FCPA, implemented by the SEC and the US Department of Justice (DOJ), 
serves two main functions. Firstly, the FCPA prohibits the use of bribes to foreign 
officials in order to obtain or secure business.6 The act defines bribery as offering, 
paying, promising to pay or giving money/gifts or any ‘authorization of the giving of 
anything’ to ‘any foreign officer’ to influence business decisions.7 Secondly, the act 
requires companies/issuers that are affiliated with US companies/bodies to comply 
with its provisions on books and record-keeping whereby the record-keeping must 
‘accurately and fairly reflect’ all payments and transactions made by the 
company/issuer.8  
The FCPA addresses three categories: issuers, domestic concerns and entities 
under territorial jurisdiction.9 This means that the FCPA applies to issuers who are 
required to file reports with the SEC, US persons and businesses as well as non-US 
persons and businesses that are affiliated with US business in any way (e.g. through 
US agents, subsidiaries, employees).10  
 
2 Transparency International, ‘What is corruption?’ (TI, 2018) <https://www.transparency.org/what-is-
corruption#define>accessed 22/12/18.  
3 The U.S Department of Justice and the U.S Securities and Exchanges Commission, ‘A Resource 
Guide to the U.S Foreign Corrupt Practice Act’ (2012) U.S Securities and Exchanges Commission, 3.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 FCPA, 15 USC §78dd-1a (1998) amended.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Christopher Garrertt, ‘Combatting Official Corruption in International Business Transactions’ (2012) 
Journal of Contract Management, 90. 
10 Ibid. 
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The Extraterritorial Application of the FCPA  
Following FCPA’s amendment in 1998 (to ensure its alignment to the 1997 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Anti-bribery 
convention) the FCPA’s definition of American business went global.  
Now, the FCPA applies to all foreign individuals and companies listed on the 
US stock exchange regardless of any territorial nexus to the US.11 If non-US 
persons/companies use forms of US communication or undertake any action of 
corruption in payment to foreign officials whilst in the US, the FCPA will also apply to 
them.12  
Furthermore, since modern commerce thrives on worldwide electronic 
communication and transactions, the FCPA’s reach extends far.13 The fact that even 
non-US companies may be subject to the FCPA given any US connection, is perhaps 
what makes the FCPA an effective tool in combatting arms corruption globally. 
Corruption within the Arms Trade Industry 
The arms trade industry is secretive in nature. Those who engage in it defend 
this secrecy by claiming that their acts are a matter of ‘national security’ or ‘off limits.’14 
However, this defence fosters further corruption in the arms industry as it allows 
bribery and other forms of corruption to go untraced. The industry is also vulnerable 
where arms companies are unfamiliar with their trading partners and are thus 
compelled to employ representatives who are familiar with the defence market and 
consumers.15 This therefore makes companies ‘reliant on the ethics of the agent’ who 
may enter into corrupt deals without the company’s knowledge.16  
Evidencing bribery is also exceptionally challenging in arms deals as they 
usually ‘invoke a complex web of intermediaries and shell companies’ that obscures 
 
11 Andrew Kaizer and Kate Learoyd, ‘The Global Impact of the FCPA’ (2007) 3 McDermott Will and 
Emery, 6.  
12 US DOJ and SEC (n3).  
13 Ibid. 
14 Frank Vogl, ‘Bribery and Corruption Still Rampant’ (Global Policy Forum, March 2001) 
<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/204/42537.html> accessed 31/12/18. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid.  
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the transfer of payments and funds.17 Therefore, it is difficult to identify the source and 
recipient of illicit payments.18 This may also problematise the scope of the FCPA where 
unknown agents carry out transactions, and it is unclear whether US citizens have 
been involved in the corruption. 
Arms Trade Offset: A Driver of Corruption 
Arms trade offset (or defence offset) is widely acknowledged as the main 
contributor to arms corruption.19 Offset is a type of counter-trade whereby an offset 
agreement creates a deal between a government (importer) and a company 
(exporter), which is often a defence/arms company.20 In the offset contract, the 
exporter makes additional deals to buy from or provide goods and services to the 
importer’s state. Often, companies provide additional benefits to the government by 
establishing factories and facilitating job creation in their country.21 By helping 
governments meet their socio-economic objectives through these transactions, offsets 
are dominated by government procurement.22 
The alarming issue however is that offsets often result in bribery. Defence 
offsets are said to induce states to enter into arms deals solely for the benefits that 
come with the agreements.23 More importantly, companies rarely disclose information 
regarding their offset agreements, thereby opening their doors to corruption.24 
According to FCPA advisor Howard Weissman, offset transactions facilitated by 
‘foreign government  customers’ and ‘offset authorities’, who choose or approve offset 
projects, ‘give rise to FCPA compliance risk.’25 From the FCPA’s perspective, when 
these actors purposefully select offset projects, it allows them to direct the work 
(especially the funds) to projects that benefit these actors ‘directly or indirectly.’26  
 
17 Samuel Perlo-Freeman, ‘Arms trade corruption–what do we know?’ (World Peace Foundation, 
11/12/128) <https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2018/12/11/arms-trade-corruption-what-do-we-
know/> accessed 31/12/18. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ben Magahy et al, ‘Defence offsets: Addressing the risks of corruption and raising transparency’ 
(2010) Transparency International; Also see: Ryan Jay-Lambrecht, ‘The Big Payback: How Corruption 
Taints Offset Agreements in International Defence Trade’ (2012) ProQuest LLC. 
20 Peter (n1), 21.  
21 Ibid and Ryan (n19). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Carola Hoyos et al ‘What are Offsets’ (The Financial times, 9/10/13) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/87728d1e-197a-11e3-afc2-00144feab7de> accessed 1/1/19. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Howard Weissman, ‘Offset Deals Can Pose High FCPA Risks for Defence Industry’ (2014) Law360. 
26 Ibid.  
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Incentivising FCPA Compliance  
One way in which the FCPA attempts to combat such corruption is by 
incentivising FCAPA compliance. In particular, by ‘incentivizing companies to 
voluntarily disclose potential violations’27 the FCPA appears to have encouraged risk-
based due diligence and transparency in offset transactions—an effective remedy for 
FCPA compliance risk.28 If companies voluntarily disclose their wrongdoings or 
proactively cooperate with the FCPA prior to government investigations then the DOJ 
promises to recommend a 50% reduction on their fines to US courts.29 However, it 
remains unclear how the DOJ plans to deal with self-reported cases.30 
Furthermore, FCPA incentives have led to confusing results as arms 
companies such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are clearly stating their offset 
obligations in their annual reports.31 In contrast, BAE Systems – one of the world’s 
largest and arguably most corrupt weaponry manufacturers – refuses to publish their 
offset report, arguing it ‘gives too much away to competitors.’32 US arms giant Northrop 
Grumman has even established company policies restricting any ‘talk about offset.’33  
Although the FCPA appears to provide a checks and balance system for 
governments, who dominate arms offsets, by allowing companies to choose whether 
they wish to practice due diligence and transparency with offset transactions, the 
FCPA does not do enough to regulate offsets. Instead of solely relying on anti-bribery 
regulations, emphasis should also be placed on governments who bear an affirmative 
duty to ensure that offsets are acquired in a fair and transparent manner.34 Moreover, 
considering offset’s monumental contribution to arms corruption, and that arms 
corruption dominates global corruption, it is alarming that the FCPA has no provision 
that explicitly prevents bribery within offset transitions, or any countertrade forms in 
 
27 Covington Advisory, ‘Trends and Development in Anti-Corruption Enforcement’ (2018) Covington 
Advisory, 2. 
28 Ibid; Peter (n3); Ben (n18).  
29 The US Department of Justice, ‘Justice Manual on the FCPA of 1977, title 9’ (The US DOJ, August 
2013) <https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/download> accessed 1/1/19.  
30 Covington (n27). 
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ryan (n19).  
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general. It would therefore be advisable for the FCPA to consider the role of 
countertrade, in particular offsets, in combatting arms bribery and corruption. 
The FCPA in Action 
Considering the aforementioned difficulties in getting conviction for arms 
bribery, why might the FCPA still be effective in combatting arms corruption?  
The FCPA has teeth  
The FCPA has heavily influenced anti-bribery legislation and ISL globally. Most 
notably, it is credited for shaping and influencing the OECD’s Anti-bribery Convention, 
which today has 44 signatories.35 Furthermore, the FCPA has also received 
recognition by the Organization of American States (OAS)—a part of the Inter-
American Convention against Corruption, with 35 members.36 
Instilling itself amongst international treaties has allowed the FCPA to expand 
its extraterritorial reach by influencing members of the OECD and OAS, amongst 
others, to inculcate anti-corruption legislations like its own, in their respective member 
countries.37 However, what differentiates the FCPA from international soft law (ISL) 
and makes its arguably more effective in combatting arms corruption is that the FCPA 
has teeth. Unlike the FCPA, anti-corruption conventions like the OECD convention 
lack ‘direct enforcement power’ as only its signatory members are obliged to create 
and adopt their own anti-bribery/corruption legislations.38 So, if member states refuse 
to comply with international law, there may be little that international bodies can do to 
enforce compliance.  
In contrast, the FCPA directly punishes violators of the act with sanctions, 
criminal penalties, disgorgements, imprisonment and hefty fines extending to a 
staggering $800 million.39 Examples are arms companies like BAE and Embraer, 
 
35 Kathleen Thompson and Charlotte Medina, ‘Bribery and Controversy in the US and Global Market’ 
(2012) 8(23) Undergraduate Review, 131; OECD, ‘OECD Anti-Corruption Convention’ (OECD, 2018) 
<http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm> accessed 1/1/19. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 DOJ and SEC (n3); Also see: Siemens, the German engineering company was set to pay $800 
million to the DOJ and SEC, See: Eric Lichtblau and Carter Dougherty, ‘Siemens to Pay $1.34 Billion 
in Fines’ (The New York Times, 15/12/08) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/business/worldbusiness/16siemens.html> accessed 3/1/19. 
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which experienced the severity of FCPA fines,40 demonstrating that actors conducting 
international business cannot afford to ignore FCPA compliance. Indeed, the FCPA is 
best known for imposing hefty fines.41 In 2010 BAE was found guilty of conspiring and 
tactfully failing to create compliance mechanisms to prevent violations of the FCPA’s 
anti-bribery provisions.42 Despite assuring the US government, companies and the 
DOJ on its anti-bribery policies, BAE made series of payments to shell companies and 
third parties (which as discussed earlier, are often used to facilitate money laundering), 
and failed to subject these actors to the level of scrutiny it promised.43 BAE ultimately 
paid $400 million in fine for its criminal conduct—one of the largest fines imposed by 
the US for FCPA violations.44 Similarly, Embraer, a Brazilian aircraft manufacturer, 
had to pay $205 million to resolve its FCPA violations as it had bribed officials in 
several countries. 45 The bribes were paid by a US-based subsidiary through third-
party agents.46  
The FCPA’s heavy (and common) fines can make it unaffordable for actors 
conducting international business to ignore FCPA compliance. In doing so, the FCPA’s 
penalties and punishment can effectively incentivise companies and governments to 
avoid bribery whilst dealing arms, thereby aiding the FCPA in its fight against 
corruption.  
Still, FCPA critics remain vocal as the DOJ and SEC provide no information as 
to how the money generated from these fines is being used to fight corruption, if at 
all.47 US authorities also remain silent on requests made by organizations and NGO’s 
 
40 The US Department of Justice, ‘BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 million 
Criminal Fine’ (US DOJ, 1/3/10) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-and-
ordered-pay-400-million-criminal-fine>; Also see: Richard L. Cassin, ‘Embraer pays $205 million to 
settle FCPA charges’ (The FCPA Blog, 24/10/16) 
<http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/10/24/embraer-pays-205-million-to-settle-fcpa-charges.html> 
accessed 3/1/19. 
41 Siemens (n39). 
42 Richard L.Cassin, ‘BAE Pleads Guilty’ (The FCPA Blog, 1/3/10) 
<http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/3/1/bae-pleads-guilty.html> accessed 3/1/19. 
43 Ibid.  
44 The US Department of Justice, ‘BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 million 
Criminal Fine,’ (US DOJ, 1/3/10) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-and-
ordered-pay-400-million-criminal-fine> accessed 4/1/19. 
45 Richard L.Cassin, ‘Embraer pays $205 million to settle FCPA charges,’ (The FCPA Blog, 24/10/16) 
<http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/10/24/embraer-pays-205-million-to-settle-fcpa-charges.html> 
accessed 4/1/19. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Luke Balleny, ‘Foreign bribery fines and settlements: who should get the money?’ (Reuters, 9/5/12) 
<http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2012/05/09/foreign-bribery-fines-and-settlements-
who-should-get-the-money/> accessed 4/1/19. 
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in developing countries to stop its retention of ‘all proceeds from fines and 
settlement.’48 The FCPA’s silence speaks volumes to its self-interest, as the money 
remains purposeless in combatting arms corruption. 
FCPA’s Implementation in the US Arms Market  
Although initially established to reduce corruption within US companies, the 
FCPA appears to be unsuccessful in fulfilling its primary aim.  
Transparency International’s 2012 report on anti-corruption revealed that 
almost two thirds of defence companies lack adequate systems to combat 
corruption.49 Leah Wawro, lead IT researcher at Transparency International’s Defence 
and Security Unit, highlights that ‘the lack of transparency amongst US companies’ 
was particularly concerning as America’s 4 major arms companies: Fluor, Lockheed 
Martin, Bechtel and Raytheon dominated the list of corrupt arms companies.50  
Despite this, Dr. Sam Freeman, head of Global Arms Trade and Corruption 
Project at the World Peace Foundation, argues that US companies ‘bribe less’ in the 
arms industry, not because the companies are inherently ‘cleaner or more moral’ but 
because the FCPA is strict, robust and has been implemented for longer than other 
European or International legislations.51 Dr. Freeman further highlights that the 
majority of arms corruption cases US authorities deal with, such as that concerning 
BAE Systems, are non-American.52  
However, the decrease in significant arms cases is not necessarily attributable 
to the FCPA, nor does it demonstrate that the FCPA was able to dramatically reduce 
bribery amongst US arms companies. In fact, recent academic literature reveals that 
the FCPA has failed to deter global bribery by US companies, despite the DOJ’s aim 
to ‘increase prosecutions’ and ‘tighten enforcement.’53 Even worse, Global Policy 
Forum reports that non-US businessmen and government officials claim that the ‘US 
 
48 Ibid.  
49 Transparency International UK, ‘Defence Companies Fail Anti-Corruption Test’ (TI UK, 4/10/12) 
<https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/defence_companies_fail_anti_corruption_test> 
accessed 2/1/19. 
50 Tamsin Walker, ‘The dangerous reality of corruption in the arms sector’ (DW, 27/4/15) 
<https://www.dw.com/en/the-dangerous-reality-of-corruption-in-the-arms-sector/a-18411848> 
accessed 2/1/19. 
51 Samuel (n17).  
52 Ibid. 
53 See: Various studies conducted in Miriam F. Weismann, ‘The FCPA Act: Why It Fails to Deter 
Bribery as a Global Market Entry Strategy’ (2014) 123(4) Journal of Business Ethics.  
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uses other unfair practices’ avoiding FCPA violation and compelling their foreign rivals 
‘to either bribe or die.’54 
Even if it is to be accepted that the FCPA’s strict implementation has reduced 
bribery within US arms companies, it is certain that US agents and subsidiaries are 
heavily involved in arms corruption. A significant example is the 2004 Boeing Tanker 
Case where Boeing agreed to a $23 billion contract for the ‘lease of 100 tanker aircraft’ 
in exchange for a job position for senior US Air Force officer, Darleen Druyuna.55 US 
companies have also faced fines for bribing United Nations officials with arms.56 Whilst 
academics have credited the FCPA’s strict implementation for a decrease in US arms 
corruption,57 US agents continue to bribe. So how can we really claim the FCPA has 
been successful in combatting US arms corruption when US companies still engage 
in corruption, even with the UN?  
Furthermore, even when US companies do not participate in bribery, the US 
still heavily accepts, receives and benefits from bribes. For instance, in the Glenn 
Defence Marine Asia (GDMA) and US 7th fleet case, the US Navy accepted Singapore 
based company, GDMA’s bribe of $500,000 and millions in luxury travels, gifts and 
entertainment in exchange for confidential information.58  
While those initiating bribery remain the main perpetrators of corruption, the 
FCPA is flawed in its failure to criminalise bribe-recipients. This is because although 
the FCPA’s reasoning for exempting bribe-recipients may rely on its concentration on 
perpetrators who start the act, corruption is a two-way street. Bribe-recipients who can 
prevent corruption by reporting bribe incidents or refusing to accept bribes should not 
be ignored. The FCPA, in this context, should follow in the footsteps of the 2010 UK 
Bribery Act, which criminalises bribe-recipients.59 
 
 
 
54 Frank (n14).  
55 World Peace Foundation, ‘The Boeing Tanker Case’ (Compendium of Arms Trade Corruption, 
2019) <https://sites.tufts.edu/corruptarmsdeals/the-boeing-tanker-case/> accessed 4/1/19. 
56 Securities and Exchange Commission v Armor Holding Inc [2011] 11-cv-01271. 
57 Samuel (n18). 
58 United States of America v Glenn Defense Marine Asia [2014] 13cr3781, 13cr3782, 13cr4287. 
59 Bribery Act 2010, section 6. 
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Limitations of the FCPA 
Besides weak defence offsets regulations, idle containment of FCPA violation 
proceedings and non-criminalisation of bribe-recipients, FCPA has other blind spots.  
The FCPA’s Vagueness  
Despite its 1998 amendment, the FCPA fails to define the term ‘foreign official.’ 
The issue of whether both public officials and private company officials are considered 
foreign officials is only magnified in developing countries where ‘lines between private 
enterprise and the state are blurry.’60 For instance, in China where the Communist 
Party ‘inextricably intertwines with all levels of the economy,’ distinguishing between 
state and private owned business is nearly impossible.61 The FCPA’s vagueness vis-
à-vis foreign officials may create a chaotic business environment.62  
Worse, companies may be encouraged to abuse the FCPA’s vagueness in the 
hope that it may decrease their chances of prosecution.63 By helping companies to 
defend their illegal transactions during litigation, the FCPA’s vagueness obstructs the 
fight against global arms corruption.  
The FCPA also provides poor guidance on its terms and requirements.64 This 
has often led to companies withdrawing from contracts that may have included 
‘questionable payments,’ as they believe that engaging in these contracts may give 
rise to liability under the FCPA, when it may not.65 The FCPA thus continues to gather 
strong opposition from the very people (and businesses) it is trying to protect because 
in aiming to combat corruption it also prevents the smooth operation of international 
business transactions.66  
What about Grease Payments?  
Grease payments are payments made to ‘expedite or secure the performance 
of a routine governmental action’ such as processing governmental visas or providing 
 
60 Matthew Muma, ‘Towards Greater Guidance: Reforming the definition of the FCPA’ (2014) 112(7) 
Michigan Law Review, 1342.  
61 Ibid, 1343. 
62 Christopher (n8). 
63 Ibid, 196. 
64 Daniel Pines, ‘Amending the FCPA to Include a Private Right of Action’ (1994) 82(1) California Law 
Review, 195.  
65 Matthew (n50). 
66 Kathleen and Charlotte (n39).  
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police protection to foreign officials.67 The arms sector particularly benefits from 
grease payments.68 The FCPA excludes grease payments from its anti-bribery.69 This 
may be problematic because much like offsets, it is difficult to distinguish grease 
payments from bribery. This is because there is no threshold, monetary or otherwise, 
by which to distinguish between the two. Typically, bribery denotes that the payment 
is ‘intended without a corrupt motive.’70 However, such intent is incredibly difficult to 
evidence in litigation. 
This being said, the FCPA’s accounting provision does require 
companies/issuers to record all payments, even if the payments are permissible under 
the FCPA.71 Even if grease payments are exempt from FCPA provisions, if facilitation 
payments are not recorded accurately then companies can still be liable for FCPA 
violations.72 Furthermore, US authorities may argue that grease payments pose less 
of a threat than bribery. 
Nevertheless, grease payments can still be considered a risk. In fact, some 
believe that they are ‘bribes in disguise.’73 The FCPA continues to exclude grease 
payment despite the OECD community’s ‘call for an end to corrosive facilitation 
payments’ and that the UK Bribery Act does not exclude grease payments.74 Here, 
once again, the FCPA should perhaps take inspiration from the UK Bribery. It also 
greatly undermines the US government’s ‘moral leverage’ when encouraging other 
countries to join the fight against foreign bribery.75  
 
 
67 FCPA, 15 USC §§ 78dd-l(b), -2(b) (1998). 
68 Jon Jordan, ‘The OECD Calls for An End to Corrosive Facilitation Payments and the International 
Focus on Facilitation Payments Exception Under FCPA’ (2011) 13(4) University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Business Law, 888. 
69 Thomas Fox, ‘The End of the FCPA Facilitation Payment Exception,’ (LexisNexis, 12/11/10) 
<https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/securities/b/securities/posts/the-end-of-the-fcpa-
facilitation-payment-exception> accessed 2/1/19. 
70 Isabella Soehn, ‘The Shortcomings of the FCPA’ (Glimpse from the Globe) 
<http://www.glimpsefromtheglobe.com/topics/economics/shortcomings-fcpa/> accessed 2/1/19. 
71 Jon (n56). 
72 Matthew Stephenson, ‘The FCPA’s ‘Facilitation Payments’ Exception: Mostly Harmless’ (The 
Global Anti-corruption Blog, 17/5/14) <https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/06/17/the-fcpas-
facilitating-payments-exception-mostly-harmless/> accessed 3/1/19.  
73 Whistleblower Justice Network (WJN),‘The FCPA & Facilitating Payments’ (WJN, 2019) 
<https://whistleblowerjustice.net/the-fcpa-facilitating-payments/> accessed 8/1/19.  
74 Jon (n56), 881; Matthew (n72). 
75 Thomas (n61).  
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Conclusion 
Although the FCPA set out to prevent corruption, especially within the arms 
trade, it appears to merely scrape the surface. In exerting its enforcement power whilst 
criminalising FCPA violators, the act appears to effectively discourage bribery and 
corruption. However, analysis of FCPA’s lack of authority in offset transactions, 
exclusion of liability for briber-takers, vagueness and acceptance of grease payments 
prevent it from becoming the commendable corruption-combating regime it set out to 
be.  
It would be recommendable for the FCPA to use the violation penalties that it 
has accumulated to invest in developing countries to safeguard their anti-corruption 
regimes and ensure or monitor due-diligence and transparency within defence offset 
transactions. The FCPA may also want to consider following in the footsteps of the UK 
Bribery Act to criminalise bribe-recipients. Perhaps most urgently however, the FCPA 
must amend its terms and regulations for clarity, to not only ensure that the act does 
not disrupt potential business contracts but to also prevent vague provisions from 
allowing companies to escape liability. Considering the FCPA’s noteworthy self-
executing power, extraterritorial jurisdiction and manifestation in ISL, its contribution 
to these changes may bolster its ability to combat bribery and corruption within the 
arms industry.  
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